Who actually financed the industrialization of the USSR. Sources of accumulation for industrialization in the USSR The working class and its life

Industrialization - the period from 1928 to 1941 (interrupted by the war), during which the Soviet government implemented the plans of the first three five-year plans, which made it possible to strengthen the industry of the USSR, as well as to ensure the independence of the military-industrial complex and the main elements of the economy from Western countries. The beginning of industrialization should be sought in the twenties of the last century, which led to the introduction of the NEP. The first conversation about the course towards industrialization (although it was emphasized that the USSR would still remain an agrarian country for some time) took place in 1925.

For a correct understanding of the essence of what is happening, it is necessary to highlight 2 main tasks facing industrialization:

• To put the USSR economically and industrially on a par with the advanced countries of the world.
• Complete modernization of the military-industrial complex and its independence from other countries.

Preparations for industrialization (period from 1925 to 1928)

In general, the road to industrialization was opened at 14 Congress of the All-Union Communist Party(b) 1925 and the 16th Party Conference in April 1929, which resulted in the creation of the basic principles of development. There were 2 industrialization plans on the agenda:

• "Starting". Indicators with the required minimum.
• "optimal". Overestimated indicators, on average by 20%.

We know that the Soviet government has always taken on the impossible. Therefore, we chose the "Optimal" plan, which had inflated interest rates. The next important event took place in April 1926. For the first time in the Bolshevik party, the idea of ​​building socialism in the USSR won, without looking back at other countries. Let me remind you that Lenin and Trotsky were supporters of the world revolution. They believed that first it was necessary to overthrow the bourgeoisie wherever possible, and only then engage in socialism. Stalin said that the USSR is a unique product, they need to cherish and build socialism here and now. Ultimately, Stalin's approach won out. But I want to note that the new path fundamentally contradicted the ideology of Marxism. The important point here is that industrialization itself has become not just an economic tool, but also a political one.

In the fall of 1926, the Bolsheviks put forward a new slogan (they loved this business): "Catch up and overtake the capitalist countries!" It was impossible to do this under the conditions of the NEP, which was already rotting in its liberality and petty trade. Therefore, more and more people supported the idea of ​​starting industrialization in the USSR, as the only means to catch up with the countries of Europe and the United States.

In April 1929, the regular party congress approved the "optimal" plan for the first five-year plan. Above we have already talked about what kind of plan it is. The main thing in this regard is the construction of new industrial facilities (factories and plants). In total, it was planned to build 1,200 new large facilities. I must say right away that in the future this plan was revised 2 times in the direction of decreasing volumes, but more on that later. The priority was given to production facilities and heavy industry. 78% of all budget revenues were allocated for the implementation of this idea.

Sources of industrialization

Industrialization required a lot of money. This is logical, because building an industry requires big money and does not give every minute return. But this was the only way to save the economy of the USSR. And the party leadership began to seek funds to create industry in all available ways:

• International trade. The Soviet government sold oil, timber, flax, gold and grain to Europe. The greatest demand was for grain, timber and oil. In total, they brought in more than 2 billion rubles annually.
• Collectivization worked actively for industrialization. Agricultural products were taken almost for nothing and transferred to the needs of industry.
• Complete abolition of private (retail and wholesale) trade. All NEP privileges were canceled. It happened in 1933. Let me remind you that the share of NEPmans in the retail market was 75%.
• Creation of "deficits". The population was deliberately limited in everything in order to invest everything in industry as much as possible. As a result, the standard of living of people in the USSR in 1933 fell by 2 times in comparison with the indicators of 1928!
• Ideological tuning of citizens. All party organizations instilled in people a sense of patriotism and duty in order for them to work better. What actually happened.
• Special equipment.

What is special equipment for industrialization

What do you mean by "special equipment"? In 1917, the Bolsheviks carried out a massive expropriation. The funds went to Swiss banks (the financial center of Europe), from where they could be used for the needs of the revolution in other countries. These funds were allocated to specific accounts and to specific people. These were representatives of the Lenin Guard.

During the NEP period, money was also received, and they also went to accounts in Swiss banks. There were only about 100 leaders of the Lenin Guard, who had accounts in foreign banks... I repeat it was not their personal money, but it was in personal accounts. Since there is no world revolution, they lay like a dead weight. And the sums were huge - an average of 800 million dollars (you just need to remember that the dollar then, in comparison with the modern one, needs to be multiplied by 20-25). That is, these were huge sums, and in the 1930s Stalin received this money and, in many respects, thanks to them, industrialization in the USSR took place.

Stalin's personal intelligence went through western banks and, bribing employees, she brought out those people who had money in their accounts. Because Stalin simply could not know this. He was not in this game at the time. This was done along other lines, for example, along the Communist International. Then the so-called Stalinist terror began, when representatives of the Lenin guard began to be arrested. At first they were given very moderate terms. But few people know that these terms (5-7 years) were exchanged for their funds in Swiss banks. These are the very special means that have solved many problems.

At the same time, a terrible crisis was raging in the world, which went down in history as the "Great Depression". Thanks to this crisis, the Soviet government was able to buy up the industrial facilities that they needed literally for a song. There is one more thing that stories rarely talk about. At the same time, the USA lost the UK market and was forced to look for new ones. The USSR market became one of them. So that part of the industrialization in the USSR was carried out with the money of American billionaires.

Industrialization progress

The period before the start of work on the first five-year plan

In fact, by 1928, a situation had developed in which all the available resources of the USSR were thrown into the creation of industry. Even then, Stalin said that without industry the USSR would be destroyed and crushed, most likely, by war (surprisingly, Stalin was practically never wrong in his forecasts).

For industrialization, 3 five-year plans were allocated. Let's take a closer look at each five-year plan.

First Five-Year Plan (Implemented from 1928 to 1932)

Technology is everything!

The slogan of the first five-year plan

The first five-year plan was supposed to produce up to 60 large enterprises. Let me remind you that it was originally planned to build 1200 objects. Then it turned out that there was no money for 1200. We allocated 50-60 objects, but then again it turned out that 50-60 objects are also a lot. Ultimately, a list of 14 industrial facilities was drawn up to be built. But these were really large and necessary facilities: Magnitka, TurkSib, Uralmash, Komsomolsk-on-Amur, DneproGES and others, no less significant and complex. 50% of all money was invested in their construction.

In total, the following indicators were identified as optimal:

• Industrial output = + 136%;
• Labor productivity = + 110%.

The first 2 years of the first five-year plan showed that the plan was exceeded, industrialization was in full swing, as a result of which the tasks were increased by 32%, and then by another 45%! The leaders of the USSR assumed that an endless increase in the plan would lead to an ever greater efficiency of labor. Somewhere it happened, but more often people began to engage in "postscripts" when the indicators were given deliberately false. True, if this was revealed, then the person was instantly accused of sabotage, and at best, the prison followed.

The first five-year plan ended with the fact that the leadership of the USSR proudly reported that the plan was overfulfilled. In fact, it did not even remotely resemble reality. For example, labor productivity increased by 5%. On the one hand, it is not bad and there is progress, but on the other hand, it was said about 110%! BUT here I want to warn everyone against hasty conclusions. Despite the fact that almost all the indicators announced before the five-year plan were not met, the country made a giant leap. The USSR received an industry and an excellent base for further work and growth. And this is the most important thing. Therefore, the result of the first five-year plan of industrialization in the USSR should be assessed positively.

Second Five-Year Plan (Implemented from 1933 to 1937)

Cadres are everything!

The slogan of the second five-year plan

The first five-year plan laid the foundation, created a quantitative indicator. Now quality was required. And it is no coincidence that the construction projects of the first five-year plan are immediately remembered, but the construction of the second five-year plan is not. The point is not that construction has become worse or ambitions have disappeared, but that industrialization has moved to the next level. That is why in these years, not enterprises, but individuals - Stakhanov, Chkalov, Busygin and others - were already heard. And this emphasis on quality yielded results. If from 1928 to 1933 labor productivity increased by 5%, then from 1933 to 1938 by 65%!

Third Five-Year Plan (Implemented from 1938 to 1941)

The third five-year plan was started in 1938, but was interrupted in 1941 due to the outbreak of war.

The third five-year plan began in 1938, and the plan for it was approved at the 18th Party Congress in 1939. The main slogan of this stage in the development of the USSR was - To catch up and overtake the Western countries in production per capita. It was assumed that this should be achieved without reducing the cost of the military-industrial complex. But since in Europe literally less than a year later, the war began - the costs were more focused on the military-industrial complex. The main emphasis of the third five-year plan was placed on the chemical and electrical industries. The measure of the activity of the five-year plan is that the national gross income should have doubled. This was not achieved, but the reason for this was the war. Still, the five-year plan was interrupted 2.5 years before its completion. But the main thing that the Soviet government managed to achieve was that the military-industrial complex became completely independent from other countries, and the growth of industry reached a stable + 5/6% annually. And this is a direct result of industrialization in the Soviet Union.

What the Five-Year Plan gave the country and their significance for Industrialization

Since the task was to create an industrial society, then the results must be evaluated based on the answer to the main question. And it sounds like this - "Has the USSR become a fully industrial country or not?" This question cannot be answered unequivocally. Yes and no, but on the whole, the problem was solved. Let me prove it with an example. Official figures say that in national income 70% came from industry! Even if we assume that these figures are overestimated (they liked to do this in the leadership of the Central Committee of the CPSU) and the share of industry in the national income was 50% - these are in any case colossal figures, which are far from many of the modern powers. And the USSR covered this path in just 12 years.

I will also give some figures for the development of the USSR in the period from 1922 to 1937:

• Up to 700 factories and plants were put into operation annually (the lower figure is 600).
• By 1937, industrial growth was 2.5 times faster than 1913.
• The volume of industry has grown significantly, and according to their indicator, the USSR is in second place in the world. Let me remind you that in 1913, the Russian Empire ranked 5th in the world for this indicator.
• The USSR became a completely independent state militarily and economically from other countries. Without this, it was impossible to win the war.
• Complete absence of unemployment. It is noteworthy that in 1928 it was 12%, but thanks to industrialization, everyone worked in the USSR.

The working class and its life

The main idea of ​​industrialization was to provide each person with work and to ensure strict control over him. In principle, this was achieved, although even Stalin's rule did not have complete control over the minds of the workers.

Beginning in 1932, compulsory passports were introduced in the USSR for everyone. In addition, penalties for violation of discipline in the workplace were tightened. For example, if a person does not show up for work without a good reason, he is immediately dismissed. At first glance, it seems that it is cruel, but the fact is that the then Soviet worker is a former peasant who is used to being watched in the village, controlled and told what to do. In the city, he received freedom, after which many were “blown away”. Therefore, it was necessary to impose social discipline. It must be said, however, that even the Stalinist regime did not succeed in solving social discipline in Soviet society to the end.

In 1940 (this was due to preparations for war), the worker lost the right to move to another job without the permission of the administration. This decision was reversed only in 1955.

Overall life common man was extremely difficult. The card system was abolished in 1935. Now everything was bought for money, but prices were high, to put it mildly. Judge for yourself. Average monthly salary worker in 1933 was 125 rubles. Wherein:

• 1 kilogram of bread cost 4 rubles.
• 1 kilogram of meat cost 16-18 rubles.
• 1 kilogram of oil cost 40-45 rubles.

Now think, what could a worker afford in 1933? By the end of the 30s, the material situation of the workers improved somewhat, however, they still felt a number of problems.

Intellectuals under Industrialization

As for the intelligentsia and engineers, then of course the 1930s was a period when the intelligentsia and engineers lived very well. Almost all of them had housemaids, and they receive a good salary. The authorities tried to provide that part of the intelligentsia that went into the service of the regime to provide conditions comparable to those of 1913. Let me remind you that, for example, in 1913 a professor received the same salary as a minister.

Specialty and its peculiarity

Since very often the plans were not fulfilled, they decided to introduce such a concept as pests, or people who interfere with the formation of Soviet power. In 1928-1931 the company "Spetsialstvo" was developed. During this campaign, up to 1000 old specialists from various fields were expelled from the country. They were also accused of not understanding the tasks of socialism. And this has become one of the hallmarks of industrialization.

What is a specialty? I will explain on specific example... For example, an engineer is told that a performance of 200% is needed. He says that this is not feasible, the technique will not stand it. The conclusion of the Soviet official is that the specialist thinks in bourgeois categories, against socialist construction, which means that he needs to be expelled from the country.

In parallel with this, there was a process of creating new workers and promoting new cadres. They were called the "Nominated". According to the results of the first five-year plan, their number was 1 million. But by the middle of 1931 it became clear that these new cadres were one of the main brakes on industrialization. And Stalin solved this problem - he returned the old specialists to their posts, gave them a good salary, and forbade the nominees to conduct negative agitation against these specialists. So the Specialization was discontinued, and the nominees practically ended.

Economy of the USSR towards the end of industrialization

It is very interesting how administrative methods and methods of cost accounting were combined. In 1934, self-financing was introduced everywhere. 2 years everything was fine. Then, in 1936, there was again strict administrative control. And so on in a cycle. That is, there was a constant combination of administrative methods and methods of cost accounting.

The first five-year plans did the main thing - they created industry and created a new economy. Thanks to this, the USSR had a future. But this is where it begins main brake- many departments and ministries. In total, 21 were created. The industry was divided between the monopolies and while there were not many of them, the State Planning Commission was able to grind them to each other. However, over time it became more difficult, and the creation of the plan gradually turned into administrative arbitrariness. And already in the 50s, the planned economy in the USSR was very, very conditional.

In any case, industrialization in the USSR was an extremely important step that provided the country with industry and a real economy, which had an effective orientation, and which was able to live independently of other countries.

April 20 - “News. Economy ”In December 1925, at the XIV Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the question of industrialization was considered. There was talk about the need to transform the USSR from a country importing machinery and equipment into a country producing them. Legislatively, the course towards industrialization was fixed after a year and a half. The country had to build up its industrial potential in a short time to reduce the economy lagging behind the developed capitalist states.

The party came from direct indication VI Lenin that "the only material basis can be large-scale machine industry capable of reorganizing agriculture." According to the first plans adopted by the country's leadership, production growth was expected by 80-100%, which was planned to be implemented within 10 years. Along with this, it was necessary to increase production in the field of heavy industry by 47-48%. At the same time, the rejection of the earlier existing NEP (New Economic Policy) meant a change in goals, a reorientation of policy. In 1926, Stalin declared that "industrialization is the main path of socialist construction."

The goals of industrialization Stalin proclaimed: “We are 50-100 years behind the advanced countries. We have to cover this distance in 10 years, or they will crush us. " The main goals of the country were set to eliminate technical and economic backwardness; achieving economic independence; the creation of a powerful defense industry and the development of basic industries.

In 1928, the whole country produced 2 trucks and 3 tractors per day. About a quarter of textile equipment, more than half of steam turbines, almost 70% of metal-cutting machines and tractors were purchased abroad. If we take the level of industrial production in 1913 as 100%, then in 1928 in the USSR it was 20%. In other developed countries, this figure was several times higher and amounted to: in the USA - 160%; in Germany - 104%; France - 127%; England - 90%.

Thus, the USSR was inferior to the advanced countries in terms of production per capita by 4-8 times. Why did the country's leadership choose the path of internal loans?

Since the solution of the entire complex of tasks and transformations of industry, agriculture, the growth of the people's well-being required huge funds, which were not available, the party leadership made a choice in favor of using internal funds due to the inability to find funding abroad. This was explained as follows:

First, as you know, it did not work to kindle a "world fire": there were no revolutions in European countries that would give hope for the creation of a single European socialist state. This meant that the USSR found itself in a blockade of capitalist countries that were not ready to recognize the new government and the socialist state as their equal.

Secondly, according to the results of the Genoa Conference held in 1922, the RCP (b) finally realized the impossibility of an influx foreign capital into the Russian economy, even discussing the question of the form of compensation to former foreign owners, subject to the recognition of the USSR de jure by the states. This was caused by the contradictions that arose between the countries: Europe wanted the USSR to recognize all the tsarist debts. Obviously, no agreement has been reached.

Later Bukharin, in his speech in support of the use of internal sources, said: “The sources may be different. They can consist in the waste of resources that we had, in the issue of paper money with the risk of inflation and a shortage of goods, in the re-taxation of peasants. But this is not stable, it can threaten a break with the peasantry. V. I. Lenin indicated other sources. First of all, the maximum reduction in all non-production costs, which are huge in our country, and an increase in labor productivity. Not emission, not eating up stocks, not re-taxation of the peasantry, but a qualitative increase in the productivity of national labor and a decisive struggle against irrational spending — these are the main sources of accumulation. ”

However, his opinion was not supported by the rest of the party members. The final decision was made according to the opinion of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU I. V. Stalin.

Despite Bukharin's opinion, the first source of funds for the development of the leading branches of heavy industry in the late 1920s. last century there were loans from peasants. Thus, in July 1928, at the plenum of the Central Committee, General Secretary JV Stalin formulated the idea of ​​"tribute" from the peasantry by introducing an "additional tax." This measure was presented as a temporary one, but soon became the norm and for a long time formed the basis of economic development in the USSR. In 1927, loans from peasants amounted to 1 billion rubles, and in 1935 - 17 billion rubles. This measure led to the impoverishment of the population: often people were left without bread and means of subsistence, which suffered numerous casualties.

The second source was the receipt of proceeds from the export of bread. The greatest amount was obtained in 1930 - it amounted to 883 million rubles. In subsequent years, grain prices on the world market fell sharply. The export of a large amount of grain in 1932-1933, when the country was on the cards, brought a total of only 389 million rubles. At the same time, the export of timber brought in almost 700 million rubles in the same years. And the sale of furs in 1933 made it possible to raise more funds than for exported grain, although grain was bought from peasants at the lowest possible price. It is also worth noting that works of art were also exported abroad. So, in 1928 the USSR began to sell the country's museum collections. Artistic export turned into a loss for Russia of masterpieces from the Hermitage, palaces of the Russian aristocracy and private collections.

The third source is the rise in prices for wine and vodka products, the sale of which has been expanding. This confirms the fact that by the end of the 20s. income from vodka reached 1 billion rubles. (the industry gave about the same amount). Since the state had a monopoly on the production of these products, all income went directly to the country's budget, and then was redistributed in favor of the economic development of the USSR.

The fourth source was the issue of paper money. The growth of the money supply, not provided with goods, continued on a large scale until the end of the first five-year plan. The issue increased from 0.8 billion rubles. in 1929 up to 3 billion rubles. this led to inflation in the country, an increase in prices, and, as a consequence, to a deterioration in the economic situation of the population.

The fifth source was "work with personnel":

1. Complete dependence of the population on labor: unemployed person remained to starve. Labor was both a duty and a need at the same time.

2. For their work they were often paid later or not at all. In order to save money, the government also held back growth. wages workers and employees. This undoubtedly undermined the interest in work.

3. Often the workers were united by mutual assistance and joint hard work, which ultimately improved the result of their work. This formed a spirit of camaraderie that helped them achieve their goals despite the difficult working conditions.

In addition, the Communist Party coordinated the processes, sending the best party representatives to industrial construction sites. A vertical structure of subordination to the people's commissariats was built, which managed the economy using administrative-command methods.

Using propaganda, the leadership quickly enough mobilized the population to participate in industrial construction projects. Thanks to this, there was no shortage of cheap labor, since numerous volunteers, mostly young people, responded to the call of the Soviet government. Komsomol members, despite the difficult working conditions and all kinds of deprivation, enthusiastically took on the most difficult projects.

The sixth source is the complete abolition of private, including retail and wholesale, trade in 1933, and the creation of a system of state trade, although at that time the share of Nepmen in retail was about 75%. Thus, the government received an additional source of funding in favor of economic transformation in the country.

The seventh source of funding for industrialization has been active collectivization since 1929. The policy of the proletarian dictatorship in the countryside was aimed at rallying the poor, increasing their activity in favor of socialism, strengthening the alliance with the middle peasantry and intensifying the offensive against the "capitalist elements."

On the eve of the first five-year plan, there were 24,000 fragmented peasant farms in the country, equipped with primitive implements. Therefore, the creation of a large collective mechanized farm in the countryside constituted a most complex economic problem, overcoming which became the main goal of the Soviet government. To fulfill the plan to enter collective farms, the leadership often resorted to forced collectivization of villages.

The next, eighth source of funding for industrialization, historians consider the use of free prison labor. The network of GULAG camps covered all the northern, Central Asian and Far Eastern regions of the USSR. So, the number of prisoners grew: at the beginning of the first five-year plan there were about 5 thousand people, a year later - almost 100 thousand, and by 1932 - more than 150 thousand people. "Repressions in the field of socialist construction are a necessary element of the offensive!" - JV Stalin explained. Meanwhile, the camp conveyor operated non-stop, as at the front: in heat and cold. Unlike ordinary workers, even horses were not always allowed to be used by prisoners in the Gulag. Much of the success in the course of industrialization has been achieved due to the cheap, almost free labor of prisoners. For example, the White Sea-Baltic Canal, named after Stalin, was fully built by those in custody.

The human factor Thus, we can talk about the numerous financial resources used for industrialization in the USSR, and yet the main source was the country's population, its potential and dedication. It is the people who are building a bright socialist future that provided the state with all the necessary materials with minimal costs from the latter. They were called enthusiasts, romantics, unmercenaries, but, be that as it may, it was they who created a huge reserve for the well-being of their country, leading by 1937 the USSR in terms of industrial production to the second place in the world (after the USA), and to the first in Europe. ... Never before in the history of the USSR has there been such a breakthrough.

The leadership of the USSR used resources without looking back at the consequences (terrible famine, death, low level life of the population and the hardest working conditions). All facts remained outside the walls of party meetings, because it was necessary to achieve the main goal - to turn the state into a powerful, economically independent industrial power.

Foreign public and private loans for the USSR in the context of industrialization are mentioned in domestic, and in the main body of foreign historiography, quite rarely. It is symptomatic that neither the USSR nor Russia has published a single scientific work on this topic, there are not even articles at the level of an article in a popular science journal. There is still little information on corporate lending in the Soviet economy (i.e., from private Western companies), there is not enough data on the conditions of the so-called. "Tied" loans for specific projects, scant information on bonded loans of the USSR in the West (in the USA, England, etc. countries). There is only indirect data on commercial loans from Soviet offshore organizations (Amtorg, sovszagranbanks). The situation with lending to the USSR at the state level looks a little better (loans for the supply of equipment from Germany, Italy, Czechoslovakia, lending to external Soviet purchases in England, France and the USA), but even this topic is being developed schematically, without any deepening. For example, it is not clear how these loans were repaid and on what terms.

It is also worth adding that there is still no real statistics of foreign trade turnover, which could be created on the basis of archival documents. The existing Soviet reference books (early 30s, 1939 and 1959) provide indicative data that have nothing to do with reality. A separate misfortune is the weak adequacy of statistics expressed in Soviet rubles or recalculated at the official exchange rate to currencies, since after March 1928 the rubles turned into only conditional counting units.

However, the absolute lack of exploration of the range of these problems is only half the trouble. Another problem is the prevalence of long-standing stereotypes about Soviet industrialization. Even now, when the fact of the broadest scope of cooperation between the USSR and the capitalist West has already been officially proven, many of the researchers take the position that the Bolsheviks carried out industrialization exclusively at the expense of "internal resources." And Western capitalists sold machinery and equipment to the USSR solely because of the Great Depression (this does not explain how the country, which accounts for 1.7% of the world trade turnover, could help the West with its purchases to overcome the crisis).

Of course, to create general conditions necessary for industrialization, collectivization was needed, and the creation of a card-distribution system, etc., but we must not forget that machines, equipment, technologies were purchased for currency. In my opinion, loans were not just one of the main ones, but the most important and, perhaps, the main source of financing for Soviet industrialization... This approach is explained by the fact that the USSR did not have its own foreign exchange reserves for industrialization.

By loans, I mean the following instruments:

Corporate loans for the supply of equipment or the sale of Soviet goods in foreign markets;
- government loans for the supply of equipment to the USSR from Western countries;
- commercial loans (corporate and government) for Soviet offshore and foreign trade organizations;
- Bonded loans, which, through the mediation of Western banks, were issued on behalf of the USSR by Soviet institutions or offshore structures;
- state and semi-state crediting of export-import operations of the USSR and sovzagranstructures by Western countries;
- issue of promissory notes by Soviet overseas institutions and offshore banks.

Here are mentioned those tools, the presence of which is proven in historiography - including at the level of archival documents. A number of similar evidence has already been published in the community. In this review, I did not give footnotes for each fact and figure, confining myself to a short list of notes. It provides links to a number of document-based publications in our community.

1. The state of the Soviet economy: the "poor" USSR and the "rich" tsarist Russia.

It is often overlooked that the Soviet Union of the second half of the 1920s was, in general, a poor country. You could even say poor. Poor in comparison with the Romanov Russia of the 1913 model. To begin with, due to the devastation and consequences of the First World War, which affected most European countries, Russia lost its foreign trade positions. If in 1913 the share of Russia in the world trade turnover was about 3.7%, then by 1928 it had dropped to 1.7%.

The decline in foreign trade is appropriate to illustrate by the example of Russian-German relations, since Germany has traditionally been one of the main foreign trade counterparties of Russia. In 1913, the share of Russia in the total exports of Germany was 8.7%. From the beginning of the 1920s and up to 1931, the share of the USSR in German exports did not exceed 3.6%. In 1913, Russian exports to Germany accounted for 13.6% of the total imports to this country. In the 1920s, Soviet deliveries in German imports did not exceed 3.2% of its total volume.

In addition to a decrease in purely quantitative indicators, Soviet exports remained predominantly raw materials - the share finished products did not exceed 12-13% in it (even by the end of the 30s it was no more than 18-19%). That is, in terms of the structure of its exports, the Soviet Union did not differ much from such states as Romania, Poland or Mexico. In addition, one should not forget that the country's foreign trade balance was not at all surplus: in the 1924-1925 economic year, the foreign trade deficit amounted to almost 150 million rubles, and in 1927-1928 - about 161 million rubles.

Translated into dollars in 1928, exports from the USSR amounted to 327, 43 million US dollars (excluding gold exports), and imports - 422, 35 million US dollars (according to other data - 405 and 487 million dollars, respectively). The difference was partially covered by gold sales (in 1927-1929 it was exported for 390 million rubles), which gave roughly about 195 million dollars over three years. Something was also brought in by the sale of art objects (in 1929, 1,052 items were sold from the Hermitage to the amount of 2.214 million gold rubles, i.e. about 1.1 million dollars).

It should be noted that in the 1920s (up to the beginning of 1930) the situation in foreign markets was favorable to Soviet export goods. For example, the price of a ton of wheat on the Chicago Stock Exchange by 1927 reached $ 72-74 and remained at approximately this level (at least $ 65-68) until 1930. On the other hand, Soviet imports from capitalist countries tended to grow, and the USSR, even with a favorable situation on foreign markets, creaked its balance.

Magazine "Soviet Trade", No. 50. // Bakulin S. Foreign trade of the USSR. M., 1928.S. 9.

It is believed that by 1927-1928 the USSR as a whole managed to restore the industry to the level of 1913, but we must not forget that this restoration had many nuances. Firstly, labor productivity in industry was one third lower than in 1913, and secondly, the ability of industry to saturate the domestic market was low, since the range of goods produced and their quantity (if not to touch upon such a specific aspect of the matter as marriage) were insufficient.

By 1928, agriculture formally restored both the livestock population and the plowed area (almost), but the yield remained at the level of 1913, if not even lower (about 7-8 centners per hectare). It will remain at the same level until the end of the 30s. However, the population of the USSR in comparison with 1913 by the end of the 1920s increased by another 15-16 million people.

2. The problem of statistics and money: what, what and how to measure?

In 1923-1924, the USSR completed the monetary and financial reform, which led to the emergence of a solid and solvent currency - the gold chervonets. However, over the next few years, this currency practically disappeared. One of the main reasons was the specific understanding by the Soviet leadership (in which there was a lively discussion about ways to industrialize the country) of financing priority state tasks. As I already noted in a post on finance and money circulation in Soviet industry in the 1930s, money for the Bolsheviks was not primary, but secondary to material goods. Therefore, they were not afraid of the threat of losing hard currency as a result of inflationary processes, i.e. pumping money into certain industries. Since the production of consumer goods in the country grew slowly, this led to a sharp drop in the purchasing power of the Soviet ruble. At the same time, there was a sharp, threefold reduction gold and foreign exchange reserves State Bank - from 296 to 90 million rubles in 1927-1929.

In 1926, the import of chervonets was banned in the USSR, and from March 1928 - export. Immediately after that, the chervonets disappeared from the quotations of the London Stock Exchange, and the Soviet Union ceased to possess the currency. In 1928-1932 money supply in the country increased by almost 2.4 times, a planned distribution system of supply was introduced in the country, prices in commercial state trade increased 5-10 times compared to the era of the NEP. Until 1936, the USSR did not have firm exchange rates. On the black market, 1 US dollar in the early 1930s cost more than 50 Soviet rubles, while the State Bank's rate was 1 ruble 20 kopecks. However, the State Bank bought the currency at this rate, but was extremely reluctant to sell it. Taking into account the financial and monetary reforms of 1930 and 1931, it can be stated that all calculations in Soviet rubles can only be indicative.

Soviet foreign trade statistics were based on the recalculation of rates foreign currencies to the Soviet ruble, taking into account the so-called. "Price level". In fact, the same indicative figures were obtained, which say little about the true volume of trade. This is shown quite clearly when comparing data from Soviet reference books with figures in dollars from archival documents of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade.

3. Planning for industrialization.

As such a single financial plan to ensure an industrial breakthrough, the Bolsheviks did not have it in the 1920s. According to the author of the book "New Economy" E.A. Preobrazhensky, it is necessary to draw funds for industrialization from the "pre-socialist economy" - that is, from wealthy peasants, Nepmen, etc. contingent. In addition, it was proposed to use taxes, compulsory loans, the so-called. state monopolies. Due to this, a sharp decline in the standard of living of the population was included in the industrialization scheme.

Note: One of the main features of Soviet industrialization was that it was not export-oriented. Simply put, the enterprises were not built in order to produce products for export (in order to “recoup” the money spent in foreign currency). Until the end of the 1930s, the export of machinery and finished products from the USSR did not exceed the level of the late 1920s by much.

However, Preobrazhensky did not limit the sources of financing for industrialization only by supertaxes on peasants and NEPmen. He also proposed to widely use the issue of paper money, railway tariffs, monopoly banking system, regular loans from the population, duties on imported goods and only in the last place - because of the instability, unpredictable fluctuations of the world market - income from foreign trade.
In proposing his own course, the course of the "left", Preobrazhensky did not hide the difficulties that accelerated industrialization would inevitably generate. “At the very beginning of socialist accumulation,” he noted, “the state conducts production, despite its unprofitableness, and strives only for the smallest loss in the entire economy as a whole, and far from always - for the smallest loss when choosing enterprises to be put into operation.

V five year plan it is necessary to proceed from the fact that over the next five years the process of industrialization of the country will very much depend on trade with abroad. This dependence will be expressed in the need to import foreign machines to equip factories and import raw materials for the light industry. " Turning to export, he immediately expressed serious doubts about the possible volume of grain export, which the State Planning Committee had outlined, and therefore suggested: “The Party and Soviet bodies need to treat export issues with much greater attention than until now. Greater success is needed in exporting goods other than grain. For example, forests, livestock products and the like. "

"The course for the accelerated industrial development those industries (group "A"), the return on which in the near future was questionable, put the problem of sources of industrialization on a practical plane. In the decisions of the April (1926) plenum of the Central Committee and the 15th party conference in November 1927, emphasis was placed on domestic savings: profits from nationalized industry, foreign trade, the banking system and state trade; the use of surplus accumulation in the country through credit, cooperation and domestic loans in the interests of industry; price policy (through lowering industrial and agricultural prices); reserve accumulations in industry, a regime of economy, an increase in the tax burden on kulaks and Nepmen, etc. This fit quite well into the general concept of building socialism in a given country.

But it was impossible to make an industrial breakthrough only on the basis of accumulations of domestic industry due to its weakness and prolonged consumption of fixed capital. Although there were projects for industrialization at the expense of petrodollars, no serious attempts were made to bring the industry outside the Caucasus at that time. The flow of capital into large state industry from the private sector was blocked by anti-epic legislation - private capital was deliberately not allowed into large-scale industry. The transfer of funds from peasant farms remained, but its market opportunities in these economic conditions were very limited.

In 1925-1927, industrialization was carried out at the expense of spending the currency of the emission tax. Since 1927, the sale of vodka to the population has been expanded, the income from the sale of which amounted to 500 million rubles. Since 1924, indirect taxes have been increasing in the country. Income from excise taxes increased from 7.1% in 1923-1924. up to 24.1% in 1926-1927. In 1926, 2 winning and 2 interest loans were issued. In August 1927, the Soviet government resorted to compulsory loans for the first time - the first loan for industrialization in the amount of 200 million rubles was placed among the urban population. This meant that by the summer of 1927, the ceiling had been reached on raising finance by conventional means. " (IB Orlov. Contradictions of industrialization: attempts at industrialization within the framework of NEP / Russia NEP (Russia. XX century. Research) / Edited by Academician AN Yakovlev. M., 2002. P.386-387).

The decline in consumption and collectivization allowed the Bolsheviks to seriously reduce consumer imports and, as a result, domestic consumption. In the long term, industrialization made it possible to abandon the purchase of a wide range of industrial products in the West - from ball bearings to tractors. This made it possible to directly benefit from the creation of import substitution production.

According to the drafts of the industrialization plan, its total cost "by eye" was determined at 4.5 billion Soviet chervonets, i.e. more than $ 2.2 billion. Let me clarify that for a country whose annual exports rarely exceeded 400 million US dollars (in the 1920s), this was a huge amount of money. The USSR was faced with the problem of finding a currency. The need for foreign exchange earnings was dictated by the fact that Western states sold foreign equipment, technologies, specialist services and simply samples of technology to Soviet Russia only for foreign currency.

Only two sources could give them: exports and credits. As for the first, then, according to A.I. Rykov at the XV Congress of the CPSU (b) in 1927, “The party and the Soviet authorities need to pay much more attention to export issues than they have hitherto. Greater success is needed in exporting goods other than grain. For example, forests, livestock products and the like "... People's Commissar for Foreign Trade of the USSR A. Mikoyan at the same congress generally shared the following point of view:

“We can raise our economy on an industrial basis and build socialism only if we - especially at first - import a sufficient amount of machinery and raw materials in order to supply our own production of means of production. But you can only import it with money earned from export, because we have neither large reserves of gold, nor foreign loans. And since our exports are lagging behind, we do not meet the country's import needs ".

The course to increase exports bore fruit - export from the USSR from 1929 to 1931 was growing steadily. However, this trend was intervened by the conjuncture of the world market, where in 1930 prices for raw materials and agricultural products collapsed. A ton of wheat on the Chicago Stock Exchange in 1930 fell from $ 65-68 per ton to $ 8-12.

Thus, Soviet industrialization, which relied on two pillars: domestic resources (which were not at all great) and exports, was under threat. Even in the relatively "prosperous" 1929 and the first half of the 1930s, exports from the USSR barely covered imports. The export of art objects and gold also did not give tangible results.

4. The trap of foreign trade.

In the 1920s and 1930s, the foreign trade of the USSR was in short supply. For example, data on trade with the United States in 1927-1940 clearly show that in just 3 years (1929-1931) Soviet Russia had a "hole" of almost 250 million dollars. In trade with Germany, another key partner, the same thing happened. In 1929-1933, the deficit of the USSR here amounted to about 824 million marks (about 275 million dollars).

K. Mueller. Aussenhandelssystem und Industriepolitik Russlands waehrend des ersten und zweiten Fuenfjahrplanes in ihrer Bedeutung fuer die deutsch-russischen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen. 1934.

The decline in purchases of finished equipment did not help the USSR either - it went in parallel with a sharp drop in the value of Soviet exports due to unfavorable price conditions, and therefore did not play the significance that was assigned to this factor. Thus, there was only one way to close the holes that had arisen - loans. At the same time, Soviet exports were not the only source of foreign exchange earnings. To understand the situation correctly, Soviet exports were loan guarantee, not an end in itself ..

From a letter to I.V. Stalin V.M. Molotov (no later than August 6, 1930):
“… The agreement with Italy is a plus. Germany will follow her. By the way, how are you doing with German loans? Force the export of bread with might and main. This is now the nail. If we take out the grain, there will be loans. ”
Letters from I.V. Stalin V.M. Molotov 1925 - 1936 M., 2001.S. 194.

It is noteworthy that the USSR began lending abroad even before the start of large-scale purchases of equipment, which came in 1929-1931.

US loans

The Soviet offshore company Amtorg paid most of its purchases in the United States with loans. According to the authoritative researcher of the history of Soviet industrialization I.B. Orlova, by the beginning of 1929 the USSR owed about 350 million dollars to American firms alone (I.B. N. Yakovleva. M., 2002. S. 386-387).

On November 26, 1927, at the Main Concession Council under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, an agreement was signed with the American entrepreneur Farquhar on providing the Soviet government with a 6-year loan for 40 million dollars for the restructuring and re-equipment of the Makeyevsky metallurgical plant (Biryukov A.M. The role of American firms in economic recovery and industrialization of the USSR (20s). In Vienna, in the same year, an agreement was signed between the Vneshtorgbank of the USSR and the American businessman Viktor Freeman to open a credit line of $ 50 million secured by Soviet exports. In 1927, an agreement was reached with the American company "Standard Oil" on a loan of 75 million dollars for the supply of Baku oil to the company "Vacuum Oil".

Until 1934, the United States did not provide state loans to the USSR, although the USSR expressed its readiness to take a loan of up to 1 billion dollars, and the People's Commissariat of Finance even made a detailed development of a lending scheme. Most of the loans to the USSR were provided by private companies, in addition, the USSR, before its official recognition by Washington in 1933, made attempts to place its bond loans in North America. In the second half of the 1930s, such loans were regularly placed by Vneshtorgbank and Amtorg. Since 1934, more than two-thirds of Soviet purchases in the United States have been financed by the American state-owned Export-Import Bank.

There is no data on the redemption of Soviet bonds (State Bank, Vneshtorgbank, Amtorg). There is also no data on the repayment of private loans.

Taking into account the fact that by the beginning of 1929 the Soviet debt to the United States was up to 350 million dollars, and the foreign trade deficit in 1929-1931 amounted to 285.6 million dollars, it is possible to roughly estimate the debt of the USSR to the United States by the beginning of 1932, at least $ 635 million. There is no data on how this debt was paid off. What was the amount of loans from the USSR (trade missions, offshore companies, banks, etc.) in the United States in 1932-1940 is impossible to say.

Loans to Germany.

In 1925, Germany provided the USSR with a short-term loan of 100 million marks; in April 1926, Germany opened a credit line for the USSR in the amount of 300 million marks for a period of 4 years. In 1931, Germany provided the USSR with another loan (tied loan) in the amount of 300 million marks for a period of 21 months. In 1935, a consortium of German banks provided a loan from the USSR to the Soviet trade mission in Berlin in the amount of 200 million marks. Thus, officially, over 9 years, the USSR received loans from Germany for 900 million marks, which is about 300-320 million US dollars. Annual Percentage on these loans was 6% (on the loan in 1935 - 5%). Last credit in the amount of 150 million marks was not returned.

In addition to the USA and Germany, loans from the USSR were provided by:

Great Britain (annually credited in the late 1920s - first half of the 1930s) Soviet purchases in the amount of up to 20-25 million pounds. In 1936, England provided the USSR with a loan of £ 10 million.
Czechoslovakia provided the USSR in 1935 with a loan of 250 million crowns (6% per annum).
Italy - a loan of 200 million lire for Soviet purchases in 1930 and 350 million lira in 1931.
Sweden in 1940 provided the USSR with a loan of 100 million kroons.

5. Conclusion: problems of debt repayment.

The total indebtedness of the USSR only to the USA and Germany at the beginning of 1932 can be estimated at about 1 billion US dollars. Taking into account borrowings from other countries, the amount could change upwards. I believe that we can quite speak of the total debt in the amount of 1.2-1.4 billion US dollars (2.4-2.9 billion gold pieces). These figures do not include bonded loans and promissory notes issued by the State Bank, Vneshtorgbank and a number of Soviet foreign institutions. In 1932, Soviet trade suffered a sharp and immediate decline. Thus, the volume of trade with the United States falls from 132 million dollars in 1931 to 26 million dollars. According to the Soviet statistical reference book, the volume of foreign trade of the USSR according to indicative indicators (in Soviet rubles at the exchange rate of 1936) fell from 8.4 billion rubles in 1931 to 5.6 billion rubles in 1932. The fall continued in 1933-1934. In 1935, the USSR's foreign trade turnover amounted to only 2.6 billion rubles.

The reasons for the decline were:

Falling prices for Soviet export goods, which could not be compensated for even by increasing supplies;
- the transformation of world markets into "buyer's markets", due to which Soviet supplies led to dumping and further price reductions;
- maintaining sufficiently high prices for industrial equipment;
- the final depletion of the USSR's gold and foreign exchange reserves;
- reduction of lending to the USSR in Western states (meaning tied loans in the first place).

According to the 1959 Soviet Statistical Directory of Foreign Trade, by July 1932 the USSR had an external debt of 1.3 billion rubles. The data is, of course, indicative.

After a year and a half, by December 1933, the USSR somehow managed, according to the reference book, to reduce it by almost 3 times to 450 million rubles, and by 1935 to bring it to the level of only 139 million rubles. There is no explanation for this miracle in Soviet and Russian historiography. The only attempt to somehow reasonably explain such dynamics was made (among those known to me, of course) S.N. Prokopovich. In his opinion, the USSR was paying off the debt at the expense of goods exported to the West in the early years, but not sold out on time. What this assumption is based on is not entirely clear, since it is doubtful that the USSR, living in extreme stress of export resources, was able to deposit certain goods abroad for several years.

In my opinion, the only source for paying off this debt (if you still believe that it was exactly repaid) could be bond loans and promissory notes in Western states (I do not take into account the sale of art, gold and jewelry, since the results of this " trade "were relatively modest). Such loans were secured by the supply of gold, some raw materials, perhaps, in some cases, loans were secured by guarantees and property of Soviet banks, offshore organizations, etc. According to unconfirmed information, the United States issued loans to the USSR on the security of the property of a number of enterprises in the copper and zinc industries of non-ferrous metallurgy.

Suffice it to say that this activity brought the USSR income incomparably greater than simple export, including gold. For example, in January-March 1934 alone, the USSR managed to partially place a loan in the United States, under which about $ 5 million was attracted. Just one week of bond sales on the security of property and income of the Soviet railways in 1928, the Bolsheviks in the United States raised about $ 100,000.

Since the practice of bonded loans in the 30s was actively used by Moscow in the USA and England, it can be assumed that this cash flow and eventually made it possible to pay off debts and even finance foreign trade, which, however, for a number of understandable reasons, was in rather modest limits in the second half of the 1930s.

P.S. This material is only a very superficial overview, written on the basis of documents known to the author.

Industrialization - the creation of a factory industry. In Russia it began in the 19th century. Goals additional industrialization:

Russia was an agrarian country. Only 10% of the population was employed in industry. The task was to turn an agrarian country into an industrial one, so that industry would become main industry her economy.

in Russia, some branches of mechanical engineering were not developed: the production of aircraft, cars. The Soviet Union declared itself an enemy of the entire capitalist world and could only rely on itself.

the danger of an imminent war. It was necessary to create a powerful military industry.

Peculiarities industrialization:

very high rates. To create new industries for the country, all forces and means were thrown, often to the detriment of other industries.

industrialization in the USSR meant the achievement of complete economic independence, i.e. development in conditions of complete economic isolation.

The question arose of how to carry out industrialization.

economic path- suggested by supporters of Bukharin 1926-1928. Use the European and American experience: continue the development of agriculture and light industry, accumulate funds in these sectors, and then use these funds to develop new branches of heavy industry. This path meant the continuation of NEP.

administrative path- 1929 concentration of the entire economy in the hands of the state and the use of administrative, non-economic methods of mobilizing resources for industrialization. Industrialization was to be carried out at the expense of agriculture and light industry, but not at the expense of their development, but through the administrative withdrawal of funds from these industries (i.e. ruin).

25.1928-1932 1st five-year plan: the plan provided for the development of heavy industry, which would then ensure the development of all sectors. Industrial production has doubled. The main forces in the first five-year plan were thrown into the construction of "giant enterprises". These new enterprises immediately became dominant in their industries, and in some cases were the first in their industries. The greatest successes have been achieved in mechanical engineering. Achievements in mechanical engineering were facilitated by the global economic crisis. In the conditions of the crisis, when all capitalist countries were in dire need of marketing their products, all bans on the sale of strategic goods to the Soviet Union were lifted and the opportunity opened up on a massive scale to purchase equipment for mechanical engineering that had not been sold to our country before. The backwardness of the light and food industries was officially recognized.

26. Collectivization of agriculture in the USSR.

By the beginning of industrialization, peasants' cooperation became more and more necessary. It was necessary to overcome the low marketability of the peasant economy. Small peasant farms did not provide room for the further development of technical progress.

In 1929-1930. mass collectivization began: cooperatives were disbanded and collective farms began to be created. To obtain funds for industrialization, they began to increase the obligatory state supplies of the peasants, which meant a return to the methods of surplus appropriation (in order not to be enrolled in the kulaks, the peasants began to reduce their production in order to pay less). Collectivization coincided with the process of industrialization. For the organization of collective farm production in the countryside were sent "25-thousanders" from among the most devoted to the ideas of the party of urban workers and party workers.

The volume of delivery of products to the state was determined by the state plan. Since the procurement plans were based on state needs and state plans for agricultural production, and not on the actual harvest, it often turned out that the collective farms had to deliver more than they produced. The state bought products at prices 10-12 times lower than market prices. Due to collectivization, agricultural production is falling: the result was the death of millions of people from hunger.

Before collectivization, agricultural machines were sent to the countryside in two ways - either sold or rented. But with the beginning of collectivization, both of these methods were unsuitable: only those who had the money could buy or rent. And equality for everyone was very important then.

Therefore, MTS (machine and tractor stations) were created to supply the village with machines. Collective farms were also obliged to pay for MTS services in kind.

The goal of collectivization: by uniting the peasants in collective farms, to obtain funds for industrialization at the expense of the countryside. But the calculation did not come true because collectivization caused a drop in agricultural production.

27. Economy of the USSR during the Great Patriotic War (1941-1945)

The military industry was one of the strongest sectors of the economy of the USSR, but with the outbreak of the war, the entire economy of the country had to be rebuilt in a warlike manner. On June 30, 1941, the GKO was created, headed by Stalin, which was called upon to further centralize the management of the economy and mobilize available resources. Under his leadership, the State Planning Commission, the People's Commissariats and departments, in general, all the economic organizations of the country worked. A week after the start of the war, the State Defense Committee approved the Mobilization National Economic Plan for the 3rd quarter of 1941, which required an increase of 26% in the output of military products from the previously planned. Priority sectors and projects were identified, the rest were frozen. On August 16, 1941, the Military Economic Plan for the fourth quarter of 1941 and 1942 was adopted. It ordered the creation of a powerful military-industrial base in the eastern regions in a short time, expand the cultivated areas and evacuate many enterprises there from the western regions. Evacuation was a companion of the entire first year of the war, during which the USSR lost up to half of its ferrous metallurgy capacity (Donbass-Krivoy Rog), Nikopol manganese deposit, Kharkov tank plant, aviation and other enterprises, Leningrad with its powerful tank factories. Agriculture suffered enormous damage. The transition of the economy to a war footing consisted in the mobilization of all resources for the needs of military production and supply of the front, the most severe rationing in distribution, the creation of new enterprises and the reorientation of the old ones to production military products, the evacuation of enterprises to the eastern regions and the intensification of labor. The intensification of labor should be understood as the most difficult, especially at evacuated enterprises, working conditions. The factories introduced a 7-day work week, reaching 14 hours a day - with meager food and rest norms. Everyone was involved in the work without fail. Old people were the first to die from hard work, less often women, but healthy men often could not stand the working conditions. For them, a "factory reservation" was introduced - and for those who could not stand the operating mode for wear and tear - this reservation was removed and sent to the front. And there they had even less chances. The drop in production reached its peak during the Battle of Moscow, and was only half of the previous year. The situation was somewhat corrected by Western supplies, but they were not very large until 1942 - mainly their size grew in 1943-1944, when they no longer played a decisive role. Supply channels included Murmansk, the Far East, and Iran, which was occupied by British and Soviet forces in the summer of 1941. Nevertheless, Lend-Lease provided all possible assistance to the economy and the army of the USSR. Since 1942, it has been producing more military products to the east than the entire USSR before the war, and the pace has been increasing in 1943-1944, but the disparities between groups A and B remain very serious. The supply of the army required a lot of food, so in July 1941 a rationing system was introduced for foodstuffs, and in 1942 - for industrial ones. The workers of especially important and heavy industries had a slight advantage. Additional meals served as a reward for overfulfilling the plan. In 1944, commercial trade of goods with higher prices by cards was introduced. Concerning, financial system, then it withstood the test of the war, money circulation was disrupted, and the money supply due to inflation increased almost 4 times.

28. Restoration of the national economy of the USSR in 1946-1950. The abolition of the rationing system and the monetary reform of 1947

The Soviet Union suffered heavy human and economic losses in the war .. For some time the people had hopes for changes for the better, but the Soviet leadership decided to continue the economic course of previous years again, using the same economic policy instruments - siphoning funds from the rural population and prioritizing development of heavy industry. The victory in the war only confirmed Stalin in the correctness of the chosen path: the "cold war" began and the USSR again stood up in opposition to the West. The restoration program was based on the five-year plan of 1946-1950. The main task: restoration of the affected regions of the country, exceeding the level of pre-war production - with a focus on heavy industry and "production of means of production." Half of the investment was absorbed by industry, only 7% by agriculture. In total, over 6,000 enterprises have been restored and built during the five-year plan. In 1950, 73% more was produced than in 1940, but investments in the industry of group B were minimal, only about 13%. Developed mainly mechanical engineering, coal and oil industry, metallurgy, electricity and transport - the growth in light industry was insignificant .. Having lost almost half of the able-bodied population, a third of the livestock and part of the equipment, which was not in abundance before, the peasants faced a terrible drought in 1946, which entailed famine in all the black earth regions of the country .. Since 1946, the norms of issuance have decreased, 27 million people. now they did not receive bread on the cards. Rural mechanization remained low - and worst of all, the old system of prices remained! The insignificant procurement prices and tax pressure of the state on subsidiary farms, which somehow ensured the survival of the rural population, non-payment for workdays and the outflow of the population to cities, led to the degradation of agriculture. Another action of the state was the monetary reform of 1947. Instead of increasing the output of consumer goods and thereby balancing the emission (the money supply increased fourfold during the war years), the state acted simply. On the night of December 14-15, 1947, the monetary reform began, which began the withdrawal of "extra" money from circulation. New money that was exchanged for old money in a 10: 1 ratio. It was pure robbery because the real rate could be 4: 1 or 5: 1. Deposits in savings banks from 3 to 10 thousand were reduced by 33%, more than 10 thousand - by half. Old bonds were exchanged for new ones at a rate of 3: 1. The exchange was carried out within just one week. Officially, this was presented as a fight against underground millionaires, but it was not millionaires who suffered, but workers in industry, agriculture and the people of the country. The abolition of the rationing system went smoothly only in Leningrad and Moscow, where food was brought from all regions of the country. In the regions, things were much worse, queues were lined up. The decline in retail prices by 10-12% was also illusory: since 1940, prices have increased 3 times, and the level of wages only 2 - which reduced the purchasing power of the population. 10-12% did not play a big role. Subsequently, the price index decreased, wages increased, but this also did not lead to a serious increase in the welfare of the population. Only one thing was great - to increase the military power of the USSR. But, as practice has shown, this achievement was meaningless.

29. Restructuring of the economic management system in the USSR in 1957. Seven-year plan for the development of the national economy of the USSR (1959-1965)

During the time of Khrushchev, who became General Secretary in September 1953, de-Stalinization did not completely take place in the country. Khrushchev swung not only at Stalin's policy, but also at the command-administrative system itself. On May 10, 1957 - in one fell swoop - 140 sectoral ministries were abolished and 105 economic councils were established, which governed industry and agriculture locally. Although the methods remained the same - directive - an economic initiative was unleashed at the level of industries. For example, in the regions of the country, the search for new, their own raw materials begins, economic ties are established and industrial complexes are formed. This created a lack of control over the center of local territorial associations. As for the economic councils, for example, the Leningrad economic council included almost the entire north-western region of the country. The economic system was abolished together with the removal of Khrushchev. Khrushchev's seven years went down in history as Khrushchev's seven-year plan - this was the period of the seven-year plan, which wedged in between the usual five-year plan. At this time, the economy of the USSR achieved the greatest economic success. There is an increase in production - both due to intensive and extensive development. Radio electronics and petrochemistry appeared, and the construction of thermal power plants began. TPPs were cheaper and built faster than hydroelectric power plants built during the Stalin era - but they did harm environment... At the same time, the transport infrastructure is improving, roads are being built, and electric trains are replacing steam locomotives. Heavy industry, which formed the core of economic development during the Stalinist era, is finally beginning to turn towards the population - refrigerators, vacuum cleaners, washing machines, televisions and other household appliances are produced. Also under Khrushchev, a major program of housing construction was adopted - the so-called "Khrushchov" or "Khrushchev", which began to settle communal apartments. An 8-hour working day with two days off is introduced, the retirement age for men (55 years) and for women (60) is reduced. The structure of nutrition is also improving - oil, sugar and other products appear in the diet of the population. In general, during this period, the modern way of life of people is taking shape. But it was overshadowed by many events, both in domestic and foreign policy. During the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, the world almost got involved in a world nuclear war, against the background of which even the victims of Stalin's times would seem moderate. In the same 1962, workers in Novocherkassk, protesting against the rise in oil prices, were shot by strike troops. And in 1963, the virgin lands suffered a bad harvest and "black storms" began in the steppes - as a result, there was a shortage of bread, which served as the final reason for the imminent displacement of Khrushchev. Another event is associated with the name of Khrushchev. In 1961, he announced that in 20 years the present generation of Soviet people would already be living under communism. Later, when the utopian nature of this idea was understood, the system of the USSR was officially consolidated under the name of "developed socialism." And the promise about communism gave rise to many anecdotes, one of which said that "communism is like a horizon that recedes as it approaches."